i.	•	ROUTIN	G AND	RECOR	D SHEET	\neg
SUBJ	ECT: (Optional)	ADEV	On a C	am £ T	- l	
FR		1	one syst	em for I	no. ST	Λ-
'"L	Chief, Policy and Pla	(C) ns Group		EXILITATION		
4E-70, Hdqs.					DATE	ΑŢ
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE building)			OFFICER'S	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from who	m	
	· ,	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	INITIALS	to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment	
1.	DD/PSI 4E-58, Hdqs.				For your review and comment by 3 July 1980.	
2.	DD/P&M 4E-60, Hdqs.					
3.	DD/CA 3D-39, Hdqs.					
4. Г	DD/PTOS				ST	ЬФ
5.						
6.						
7.						
8.						
9.						
10.						
11.						
12.						
13.						
14.						
15.						

- -- Nondisclosure Agreement executed under NSA aegis
- -- SAFSS indoctrination for access to a particular system $\,$
- -- Department of Energy certification for a particular product access
- 3. We have an approved APEX Security <u>Policy</u> Manual for Industry; DIA is drafting a large and detailed implementation manual, which I intend to review before publication. Once both are issued, I propose to require that all U.S. parties are bound by the two publications; that is, CIA must abide by the added detail in the DoD implementing procedures.
- 4. I believe that more effort is necessary to assure that all hands recognize what is involved throughout the Community and that CIA must be as pure as IVORY in this context.
- 5. A part of the problem in operating a single system is alleged by some to lie in DCIDs, especially 1/14 and 1/16, and in the NFIB policy on physical security. Some say the problem is that they are not sufficiently specific and detailed. Others say that they are misinterpreted in accord with local circumstances—frequently having to do with resource limitations. Another concern is "poly" or "no poly" for contractors. DCIDs are a separate problem, bearing heavily upon the creation of a single SCI system, but they are not proposed as a topic of this discussion.
- 6. I request, consequently, that I speak, in the presence of you and Mr. Carlucci, to the Deputy Directors, augmented by the Directors

of Security, Logistics, perhaps Directors of OD&E, NPIC and OSO, Ev Hineman, as CIA SIO, and whomever else you suggest on this problem.

A DCI Staff Meeting might be appropriate even if it did not contain some of the listed office directors. I would take perhaps ten minutes.

7. After CIA's house is very clearly in order, a presentation probably should be made at NFIB, but a recommendation to that end should await assurance of clear perceptions by CIA officials. As I understand the reality, CIA and NSA are regarded by the rest of the Community as the principal creators of difficulties in that both impose what others consider extra-DCID standards on contractors. This memorandum was coordianted with Directors of Security, Logistics and Office of Development and Engineering.

Q	_
U	•

